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Abstrat
We present a modal logi based approah to the so-alled endophysial
quantum universe. In partiular, we treat the problem of preferred bases
and that of state redution by employing an eleti olletion of meth-
ods inluding Baltag's analyti non-wellfounded set theory, a modal logi
interpretation of Dempster-Shafer theory, and results from the theory of
isometri embeddings of disrete metris. Two basi priniples, the bisim-
ulation priniple and the priniple of imperfetion, are derived that permit
us to ondut an indutive proof showing that a preferred basis emerges
at eah evolutionary stage of the quantum universe. These priniples are
understood as theoretial realizations of the paradigm aording to whih
the physial universe is a simulation on a quantum omputer and a seond
paradigm saying that physial degrees of freedom are a model of Poinare's
physial ontinuum. Several omments are given related to ommuniation
theory, to evolutionary biology, and to quantum gravity.
Keywords: modal logi; non-wellfounded set theory; Baltag's strutural set theory;
proximity spaes; quantum theory; universe
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1 Introdution
The present work aims to give an attempt for a nite and omplete quantum de-
sription of the physial universe by using elements of modal logi and set theory.
The term nite means that it is a system of only nitely many physial degrees of
freedom. Completeness means that the universe is understood as a losed quan-
tum system without an external lassial world and without any observers outside
the quantum system. Sine all relevant physial phenomena have to be explained
from within the quantum system, omplete desriptions are often attributed as
endophysial. Hene, the apparent reality of a lassial physial world along with
our experiened reality of ourselves as observers with a free will beomes an emer-
gent onept in this understanding. Emergene is seen as a phenomenon known
from physial systems with a suÆient number of physial onstituents and with
a suÆiently omplex evolution of the latter. Emergene often manifests itself in
global physial behavior that annot be understood properly by looking only at the
system's loal onstituents.
The idea of treating the universe as a losed and disrete quantum system is
not new. For example, already in 1982 Feynman [15℄ explored some impliations
of the assumption that the universe (the physial world in Feynman's terms) is a
quantum omputer representable as a tensor produt of many nite Hilbert spaes
of low dimension suh as qubits. Considerations like this one suggest to look at
the evolution of the universe as a run of a quantum automaton. This happens in
a very similar manner to lassial ellular automata{ like Conway's Life [17℄, for
example{ whih evolve in a sequene of disrete steps. A quantum automaton is
thus any nite system in some predened initial state together with some rules that
govern its step-wise evolution. The rules themselves have to be onsistent with
the laws of quantum physis; lassial ellular automata an therefore only be a
limiting ase of quantum automata. But even in simple lassial ellular automata
rih varieties of omplex patterns emerge [29℄, thus it is at least not implausible
to think of our physial universe as the output of a quantum automaton.
In a reent series of papers [11, 12, 13℄ Eakins and Jaroszkiewiz present this
idea again using a more involved physial framework. Briey stated, their approah
postulates that the universe is represented in a Hilbert spae H of very large but
nite and xed dimensionality N
0
. A ertain state vetor 	

2 H represents the
urrent pure state of the universe. This state is an element of an orthonormal basis
given through the family of non-degenerate eigenstates of a Hermitian operator


ating on H; the family of eigenstates of 

is the so-alled preferred basis
while the operator itself is phrased the self-test of the universe. Also, they suggest
that the state of the universe is subjet to hange. This hange is governed by
some rules, yet unknown, that map 	

onto its suessor 	
+1
. Thus the index
 labels the suessive stages of the universe and is alled the exotime. These
rules guarantee further that 	
+1
also is an eigenvetor but this time of a dierent
Hermitian operator 
+1
. The main argument of Eakins and Jaroszkiewiz is that
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at eah stage  the Hilbert spae H fators in a tensor produt
H = H
1

 : : :
H
N
of N Hilbert spaes H
i
eah having a prime dimensionality d
i
= dimH
i
. States
in H an be total fator states, they an also be totally entangled, and also it is
possible to have states that ontain fators of entangled states. Thus 	

admits
the general form
	

= 	
1


 : : :
	
f


where f

 N. Sine it is believed that any self-test has the apaity to hange
the fator struture of a given state 	

when going from one stage  to the next
stage  + 1, the orresponding transition amplitude alulated with Born's rule
may or may not fatorize. This observation allows to look at groups of fators
that beome entangled in the suessor stage or at entangled states from subreg-
isters that beome fatorized within the next stage. When followed over several
suessive stages, the transition amplitudes between states resemble the struture
of ausal sets (for details, see [12℄); it is in this manner that the building bloks
of Einstein loality seem to be aessible. Moreover, Eakins and Jaroszkiewiz
speulate about further impliations of their approah, suh as the possibility that
highly fatorized states should orrespond to a quantum system with emergent
lassial behavior.
Although the quoted results and ideas surely motivate for further work into
this diretion, our immediate goal is to take a step bak and to reapitulate the
ommon assumptions and prerequisites that form the basis of this approah to a
omplete quantum universe. In doing so we list a group of questions that are at
the soure of all arguments presented in this work.
1. If the universe admits a representation by means of a Hilbert spae H of
xed nite dimension N
0
, what auses the hoie of the number N
0
? For
now, there does not seem to be an immediate physial reason behind the
hoie of N
0
. We know that at present time this number must be giganti
but has this been the ase throughout the history of the universe? In other
words, is it neessary that the Hilbert spae is stati with a xed number of
dimensions?
1
2. We know that Hermitian operators represent observables in quantum physis,
but why should the self-test of the universe 

be Hermitian and non-
degenerate. At least suh an extrapolation from loal physial experiene
to the universe as a whole is relatively bold. Must we simply aept it as a
matter of fat or an we possibly nd a reason that explains these properties
of 

?
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For the approah of Eakins and Jaroszkiewiz this question implies another argument, namely,
thatN
0
must not be prime sine otherwise no non-trivial tensor produt of subregisters is available.
Is there a physial reason behind this?
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3. How does the preferred basis, i.e. the family of orthonormal eigenvetors of


, emerge at eah stage of the universe? This question{ also referred to as
the problem of pointer states{ was reognized by Eakins and Jaroszkiewiz
and has been a entral issue in various approahes to the measurement
proess in quantum physis (e.g., in the deoherene framework and in the
many-worlds approah).
4. How does state redution or, more appropriately phrased, state seletion
our at eah stage of the universe. In [12℄ it has been plausibly argued that
	

always is a pure state, but how does the universe make a hoie between
the available elements of the preferred basis? This question addresses the
seond entral (and still undeided) issue of the measurement proess. To
put it dierently, is von Neumann's formal haraterization of the measure-
ment proedure, that is the distintion between proesses of type II (unitary
dynamis) and type I (redution), the nal word or an we do better in
haraterizing a (non-deterministi) proess responsible for state seletion?
5. What is the mathematial struture of the Hilbert spae H? Sine any
quantum theory of the universe should propose an expliit onstrution of
the Hilbert spae of physial quantum states, we ask whether we an identify
the preferred basis elements ofH. This is the step of going from an abstrat
Hilbert spae to a onrete Hilbert spae where physial states are expliitly
given.
Our intention is to disuss these ve problems and to investigate possible
solutions. All ve problem statements are ultimately related to questions about
the physial nature of observers who ondut measurements, about the observable
objets, and about the proess of measurement. Our strategy is to introdue two
basi priniples and to nd their mathematial representations in order to gain
further insights into these problem statements and, eventually, into the nature of
the quantum universe. To the knowledge of the author, these priniples as well as
the mathematial methods related to them have not yet been widely used in this
problem domain.
The rst priniple onerns our ability to pereive nature through experiments
(every measurement we all an experiment). By experiments we do not only
mean an experimental physial set-up and its ondution in the usual sense but
also the ultimate lass of experiments that we arry out on ourselves in order
to beome aware of any experiment whatsoever, namely, our sensory pereption.
The imperfetion priniple says that every experiment in nature has to be blurred in
some sense. This means that there must always be a set of several measurement
outomes suh that eah member of this set must not be pereptually separated
from any other member of the same set. Experiments of this kind we all imperfet
experiments, and hene the priniple demands that any experiment in nature must
be imperfet. This makes sense in many ases beause empirially we know that
experimental data has limited preision. But there are types of experiments where
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it is apparently more diÆult to reognize the validity of the imperfetion priniple.
For example, onsider a Stern-Gerlah experiment with a detetor sreen plaed
behind the magneti eld. The spin value in z-diretion of a spin 1/2 partile shall
be determined. Imagine the measurement outome now is a dot at the upper
half of the sreen signalizing that the measured partile has a value of +1/2 in
z-diretion. As it seems, there is no fuzziness in the measurement outome sine
the partile spin in z-diretion has been uniquely derived by measurement. But
is this really the ase? In this situation the experiment outome onsists of the
physial objet 'sreen' together with a physial objet 'dot' on it. If we now ome
loser to the sreen we may observe a hemial reation, blurred aross an area on
the sreen, whih gives rise to the visible dot. The dot, being a loud of hemially
interating parts (these parts an be groups of moleules, for example), has many
physial degrees of freedom and these degrees of freedom must be orrelated with
the measured partile beause they materialize the experimental result. Reall
that aording to a widely aepted interpretation of quantum mehanis it is
only through the experiment result that a quantum entity beomes a real physial
objet with a measured physial attribute. Hene, it does not make sense to say
that the observed partile has only one degree of freedom (+1/2 or  1/2 in z-
diretion) beause what we atually observe as a measurement result (by means
of the hemially interating loud on the sreen) is a physial system that has
many more. Parts an therefore be viewed as the material onstituents of the
physial objet 'partile with spin +1/2 in z-diretion'. Now many of these parts
an be separated but at the same time some beome indisernible in our visual
eld no matter how lose we observe the loud beause every time we zoom-in
a new family of parts may emerge. In this sense every experiment result an be
partitioned suh that the imperfetion priniple holds. We see that the priniple is
intimately related to our senses (not only to our visual sense but to all our senses
that interat with the outer world) in that every physial experiment ultimately is
an experiment arried out through our sensory apparatus; onurrently, our senses
give rise to a olletion of non separable outomes of experiments. We return to
this issue in setion 5 where we will see that{ from a mathematially point of view{
any family of parts forms a omplete ortholattie realized through a non-transitive
binary relation alled the proximity relation P . From a physial point of view we
will reognize parts as a model of Poinare's physial ontinuum.
Our seond priniple, alled the simulation priniple, says that the universe is
a quantum automaton with a ertain simulation running on it. The priniple goes
further in that it postulates that the aforementioned simulation exeutes a ertain
evolutionary proess known from set theory. The set theory in question is Baltag's
Strutural Theory of Sets (STS) [2℄ whih is a non-wellfounded set theory based
on innitary modal logi. Non-wellfounded set theories are logially weaker than
onventional set theories (suh as the lassial Zermelo-Frankel-Axiom of Choie
(ZFC) set theory): they do not have an Axiom of Foundation. Baltag's Strutural
Set Theory operates onurrently on two sides. On one side it operates with
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modal logi, i.e. a non-lassial logi that allows for modalities of propositions
suh as possibility and neessity, while on the other side it represents all those sets
that satisfy modal sentenes by the so-alled satisfation axioms. In STS, modal
sentenes are regarded as analytial experiments whih means that eah modal
sentene is a possible statement about sets, and where the answer is the set that
satises this statement. In this manner STS is an analytial set theory where sets
are disovered as opposed to syntheti set theories, suh as ZFC, where sets are
built reursively by means of the usual iterative onept of set. There is a natural
proess of logial evolution in STS that omes with a reursive formulation of
modal sentenes. The proess is represented as a sequene of modal sentenes
ordered by instanes of the ordinals. Eah ordinal  gives rise to a stage of
strutural unfolding of a set. Thus a priori an arbitrary set is ompletely unknown;
instead it reveals its struture only step-wise through the suessive stages of
unfolding. The higher the stage ordinal  the better is our information about the
analyzed set.
The simulation priniple now postulates that the quantum automaton runs
a simulation of the strutural unfolding proess of an initially unknown lass U
alled the universe. Strutural unfolding generates a -sequene fM

U
g of so-
alled Kripke models (or, Kripke strutures) of modal logi. Loosely speaking,
eah Kripke model M

U
is a rooted graph with a nite number of labeled nodes
and direted edges. The edges thus dene a binary relation R

U
on the set of
nodes; it is referred to as the aessibility relation while the orresponding nodes
are often termed possible worlds. In the ase for M

U
the aessibility relation is
understood as the membership struture 2 between sets and their members (whih
in general are sets again){thus every M

U
anonially represents a tree. Aording
to the simulation priniple, it is this tree that is supposed to be simulated on the
universal quantum automaton. For a more rigorous treatment of this situation
we will show that this kind of simulation an be naturally represented by the
well established mathematial onept of bisimulation. A bisimulation 
B
is an
equivalene relation between Kripke models. Indeed, bisimilar Kripke strutures
have the same modal language in that they share the same olletion of modal
sentenes. In order to establish the so-alled bisimulation priniple, we employ the
previous imperfetion priniple and postulate the existene of a seondary Kripke
model
+
M


in whih the aessibility relation for Kripke models is given by a
proximity relation P


. This is the rst main step in our approah. It expliitly
aounts for the inability to perform perfet physial experiments and it plaes
this essential into the Kripke model
+
M


. We then show that
+
M


beomes the
quantum universe if it is onurrently identied as the immediate simulation ofM

U
;
and the attribute of being a \immediate simulation" we express mathematially
through the onept of bisimulation. Thus the seond step is to realize that both
Kripke models, M

U
and
+
M


, are equivalent in the sense of bisimulation although
both refer to dierent strutures originally: M

U
refers to an abstrat membership
struture in set theory while
+
M


refers to the struture of indisernible outomes
of physial experiments. In this manner the preliminary simulation priniple turns
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into its mathematial form. It says: for all ordinal stages  of strutural unfolding
of the universe U the Kripke modelsM

U
and
+
M


are bisimilar, viz. M

U

B
+
M


:
Having introdued the basi priniples we may now outline our strategy on-
erning the analysis the ve main problems related to the quantum universe, i.e.
questions (1.) { (5.). First of all, in setions 2, 3, and in 4, we give an eleti
summary of the mathematial methods we need to employ. This summary involves
modal logi, Dempster-Shafer theory and its relation to modal logi, and Baltag's
strutural theory of sets. In setion 5 we introdue the so-alled quantum sets,
whih is another term for parts of pereption as mentioned earlier in this intro-
dution. We explain how parts are related to imperfet experiments. Following
the works of J. L. Bell [3, 4℄, we show how quantum sets are used anonially to
model quantum logi.
The main part the present text onsists of the setions 6 and 7. Both parts
ontain quite dierent mathematial aspets and therefore we put them in two
dierent setions. However, both setions belong together logially beause they
onstitute an indutive proof of our assertion aording to at any ordinal stage of
the quantum universe there is a preferred basis.
In doing the indutive proof, we rst take for granted the existene of an
appropriate Hilbert spae struture H

along with an orthonormal basis b

of
eigenvetors of a Hermitian homeomorphism on H

; this happens in setions 6.1
and 6.2. The indution step, i.e. the proof that this is also the ase for the
suessor stage  + 1, is made throughout the rest of the present artile. The
proof step begins in setion 6.4 where the Kripke struture M

U
is introdued;
in this setion we also disuss the role of the strutural unfolding proess as
the main evolutionary proess of the universe. In setion 6.5, then, we derive a
preise formulation of the Bisimulation Priniple. As a diret appliation of the
Bisimulation Priniple we quote our main result, Proposition 6.1, whih nishes
the indutive proof.
In setion 7 we study the disrete tree metri struture that follows naturally
from the Bisimulation Priniple. We nd that tree metris an be isometrially
embedded into the normed spaes L
1
and l
1
. In this ontext we stress ertain simi-
larities to error orreting odes. This haraterization allows for a non-neessarily
isometri embedding of the tree metri into the Eulidean spae l
2
. The onstru-
tion of an Eulidean distane matrix out of the embedded vetors in the Hilbert
spae l
2
is the last step; the distane matrix represents the self-test 

and its
eigenvetors form a non-degenerate basis of H

. This step ompletes our indu-
tive proof in that it justies Proposition 6.1 a posteriori.
In setion 8, we lose with several omments and remarks about our results.
7
2 Basis of modal logi
Modal logi is a natural extension of lassial, i.e. binary, logi. It is onerned with
logial fats, suh as logial inferenes, that involve modalities, i.e. qualiations
of propositions. Its language onsists of atomi propositions '; ; : : :, of logial
onnetives :;^;_;);,, of modal operators of neessity ✷ and possibility ✸,
and of supporting symbols (; ); f; g. The main objets of interest are formulas or
sentenes: any atomi proposition is a formula; and if ' and  are formulas, then
so are :'; ' ^  ; ' _  ; '(  ; ',  ; ✷'; ✸'.
Modal languages often are introdued as formal systems equipped with extra
axioms or with additional inferene rules; however, the ommon basi struture
of modal languages as introdued above will be suÆient for now. Eah formula
assesses a meaning through its truth value given in a ontext. These ontexts are
expressed in terms of models of modal logi. A model, M, of modal logi is the
triple
M = hW; R; V i ;
where W is a set of possible worlds, R is binary relation on W , and where V is a
set of value assignment funtions, one for eah world in W , by whih a truth value
of truth (T ) or of falsity (F ) is assigned to eah atomi proposition. The triple
hW;R; V i is also referred to as Kripke struture (other frequently used terms
are Kripke model of modal logi or Kripke semantis for modal logi). Value
assignment funtions are indutively applied to all onstrutible formulas in the
usual way, the only interesting ases being
v
i
(✷') = T i 8w
j
2 W : w
i
Rw
j
implies v
j
(') = T ; (1)
with v
i
; v
j
2 V and w
i
; w
j
2 W for all indies i ; j , and
v
i
(✸') = T i 9w
j
2 W : w
i
Rw
j
implies v
j
(') = T : (2)
The binary relation R is alled aessibility relation; we say that the world w
j
is
aessible to world w
i
when w
i
Rw
j
. We assume that W is nite and that its
ardinality is denoted by a natural number N = jW j. It is onvenient to denote
W = fw
1
; w
2
; : : : ; w
N
g and to represent the relation R by an N  N matrix
R = [r
i j
℄, with omponents
r
i j
=
{
1 if w
i
Rw
j
;
0 if :(w
i
Rw
j
) :
Additionally, for a formula ', we will often write v
i
(') = 1 when v
i
(') = T , and
v
i
(') = 0 when v
i
(') = F . For further purposes, we onsider also a weighting
funtion 
. This funtion beomes a omponent of the model M and maps
possible worlds into the real interval [0; 1℄ so that
N∑
i=1

(w
i
) = 1 :
It is also useful to denote 
(w
j
) as !
j
.
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3 Dempster-Shafer theory and modal logi
Dempster-Shafer theory (often referred to as Evidene Theory) an be titled a
mathematial desription of belief [25℄. The latter is a generalization of the mathe-
matial onept of probability. An intuitive approah is rst to look on probabilities
in their elementarity, and then to mathematially generalize the onept of the no-
tion of point probability towards set probability. Whenever a ondition H 2 Y is
at plae, it may give rise to a probability for an event e 2 X to happen; this
situation normally is expressed by a mapping P (ejH), where X and Y are assumed
to be nite sets. Also, P obeys Kolmogorov's axioms of probability and returns a
probability value for any of the elements x 2 X whih altogether are interpreted as
mutually exlusive events. Thus the domain of P onsists of individual elements
or simply (labeled) points of the set X. With the additivity law for probabilities at
hand, P is used to generate a probability measure on the power set of X, P(X).
Dempster-Shafer theory now takes on a broader view and onsiders already from
the beginning a real valued mapping m with domain P(X). This mapping is the
basi probability assignment sharing the following properties
m(;) = 0 ;∑
A2P(X)
m(A) = 1 : (3)
A set A 2 P(X) with m(A) > 0 is alled a foal element. Given a basi probability
assignment m and a set A 2 P(X) one denes the total belief of A as
Bel(A) :=
∑
BA
m(B) :
Bel is a measure on P(X) and it is alled the belief measure. The dual value of
Bel(A) is given through its total plausibility
Pl(A) := 1  Bel((A)) ;
where  denotes the set omplement of A. Likewise, Pl is the plausibility measure.
Although Bel turns out to be a measure P(X) it does not, in general, follow the
rules of probability measures. One main dierene is that Bel generally obeys the
super-additivity rule rather than the ordinary additivity law for probability measures
(In its dual analogy, Pl has the sub-additivity property.). Thus given two sets
A;B  X we have
Bel(A [ B)  Bel(A) + Bel(B)  Bel(A \ B) :
In [23℄ it is argued that sine in quantum mehanis we naturally ome into sit-
uations where \probability measures" do no share the additivity rule,
2
belief and
2
Think of a probability P
12
of a state  
12
that is a non-trivial superposition of two quantum
states  
1
and  
2
, then P
12
6= j 
1
j
2
+ j 
2
j
2
. On the other hand, when we wish to obtain the
total probability P
12
of those two states not being in a superposition we have P
12
= j 
1
j
2
+ j 
2
j
2
.
9
plausibility measures of Dempster-Shafer theory desribe \probabilities" in quan-
tum mehanis more naturally. We follow this idea and show in setion 6 of
this paper that Dempster-Shafer theory of evidene indeed beomes the proper
oneptual framework when dealing with amplitudes of the  -funtion.
We lose this setion by quoting a result due to [22℄. This result establishes a
relation between Dempster-Shafer Theory and semantis of modal logi. In fat,
Dempster-Shafer theory an be represented in terms of a model of modal logi if
we employ propositions of the form
'
A
: \A given inompletely haraterized element  2 X is haraterized as an
element  2 A" ,
where A 2 P(X). It is then suÆient to onsider as atomi propositions only
propositions '
fxg
, where x 2 X. General propositions of the kind '
A
are then
dened by the formulas
'
A
=
∨
x2A
'
fxg
for all A 6= ; and
'
;
=
∧
x2X
:'
fxg
:
For eah world, w
i
2 W , of a Kripke struture it is assumed that v
i
('
fxg
) = 1
holds for one and only one x 2 X; this property is alled singleton valuation
assignment (SVA) [7℄. Also, the relation R is assumed to be reexive or at least
serial, i.e. for all w
i
2 W there is a w
k
2 W suh that w
i
Rw
k
. Under this
assumption Resoni et al. [22℄ propose a modal logi interpretation of the basi
funtions in Dempster-Shafer-Theory:
Bel(A) =
N∑
i=1
!
i
v
i
(✷'
A
) ; (4)
Pl(A) =
N∑
i=1
!
i
v
i
(✸'
A
) ; (5)
m(A) =
N∑
i=1
!
i
v
i
(
✷'
A
^
[∧
x2A
✸'
fxg
])
: (6)
In setion 6.6 we will demonstrate how m(A) in equation 6 is used to establish a
modal interpretation of Born's rule.
4 Baltag's strutural theory of sets
In his seminal work [2℄ Baltag onstruts a non-wellfounded, universal set theory
based on a strutural oneption of sets. Briey stated, a non-wellfounded set
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theory is a set theory where the membership relation 2 is not wellfounded as op-
posed to wellfounded set theories like Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) set theories whih
inlude the Axiom of Foundation. Several non-wellfounded set theories have been
proposed by means of additional existene axioms sine in 1954 Bernays proved
the relative independene of the Axiom of Foundation in ZF [5℄. Systemati on-
strutions of non-wellfounded set theories by introduing so-alled Antifoundation
Axioms (AFA) date as far bak as 1926 when Finsler introdued the Finsler-AFA
(FAFA) in set theory [16℄. In non-wellfounded theories \exoti" sets like
a = fb; ag or a = : : : fffbggg : : :
may appear. Suh sets are often alled hypersets and are used to represent
self-referential strutures or situations beause a non-wellfounded set may|for
example{well beome a member of its own member. A strutural understanding
of sets is dual to the lassial iterative (i.e., syntheti) onept of set. While in the
latter we onsider sets as built from some previously given objets in suessive
stages, the former presupposes that a priori a set is a unied totality that reveals its
abstrat membership struture only step by step through the proess of strutural
unfolding. This stepwise disovery of the set struture is generated by imposing
questions (whih Baltag alls analytial experiments) to the initial objet; the an-
swers to these questions are the stages of strutural unfolding. The idea behind
it is that sets are what is left when we take an aggregate (a omplex objet, to
say) and we abstrat everything but its membership struture. This struture is
pointed, in that it has a root: the underlying proess of unfolding the struture, by
suessive deompositions, has a starting point, namely the very objet under on-
sideration. Thus sets are here oneived as pointed binary strutures; this is the
same as onsidering a Kripke struture with a distinguished set (i.e., the root) and
having an aessibility relation representing membership. Thus loosely speaking,
many sets may be oneived simply as pointed, direted graphs. At a given stage
of unfolding, whih is labeled by an ordinal , we have only a partial desription
of the set onsidered. Let this arbitrary set be a, and let a

be the present stage
of unfolding; then, in order to obtain the next stage of unfolding, we take the set
of all  unfoldings of the members of a. For limit stages  (i.e., when  is a limit
ordinal), suppose we are given all  unfoldings a

of a with  <  (Although we
are going to quote the unfolding rule for limit stages , all methods presented in
this work will refer to nite ordinals only.) Observe that there is already a temporal
metaphor within: there is a \logial" onept of time, given by a suession of
stages of strutural unfolding. Now naively, the unfolding proess an be dened
by the following reursion on the ordinals: for every ordinal  and every set a, the
unfolding of rank  is the set a

, given by
a
+1
= fb

: b 2 ag
a

= ha

i
<
, for limit ordinals, :
Surely, this denition is meaningful for all wellfounded sets, but for a larger objets
it is inappropriate in general. Larger objets are general pointed systems, i.e. a
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generalization of the onept of graphs in whih the olletions of all pairs of
nodes may form proper lasses. Sine 2-reursion is equivalent to the Axiom
of Foundation, 2-reursion as introdued above is in general not appropriate for
pointed systems that are proper lasses also.
To nd a denition of strutural unfolding for more general objets, i.e. all
pointed systems or proper lasses, Baltag takes seriously the fat that at every
ordinal stage we an only have a partial desription of a system. This desrip-
tion is realized through formulas in modal language desribing the membership
struture at a ertain stage of unfolding. An essential ingredient here is the ob-
servational equivalene between systems. Observational equivalene is given by
an equivalene relation on modal formulas; this notion does therefore not refer to
the intended sets or lasses diretly, rather it studies the underlying language of
modal sentenes assoiated to these sets or lasses. It turns out that with inni-
tary modal logi observational equivalene between arbitrary pointed systems an
be naturally dened. In STS, a modal theory th(a) for every set a is onstruted
through the so-alled satisfation axioms. Before we quote these axioms we may
rst introdue the underlying modal language.
1. Negation. Given a possible desription ' and an objet a, we onstrut a
new desription :', to apture the information that ' does not desribe a.
2. Conjuntion. Given a set  of desriptions of the objet a, we aumulate
all desriptions in  by forming their onjuntion
∧
.
3. Unfolding. Given a desription ' of some member (or members) of a set
a, we unfold the set by onstruting a desription ✸', whih aptures the
information that a has some member desribed by '.
The language generated by these three rules and whih allows for innitary on-
juntions is alled innitary modal logi, L
1
. With
∨
and ✷ as the duals to
∧
and ✸, respetively, we introdue some other operators:
✸ =: f✸' : ' 2 g ;
✷ =: f✷' : ' 2 g ;
' ^  =:
∧
f'; g ;
' _  =:
∨
f'; g ;
4 =:
∧
✸ ^ ✷
∨
 :
The satisfation axioms presume the existene of a lass a Sat; eah element of
Sat is a pair of a set a and a modal sentene '. Writing a j= ' for (a; ') 2 Sat,
these axioms read as
(SA1) a j= :' i a 6j= '
(SA2) a j=
∧
 i a j= ' for all ' 2 
(SA3) a j= ✸' i a
0
j= ' for some a
0
2 a
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Thus given a set a its theory, th(a), onsists of all modal formulas satised by
a by means of these axioms. With this setting the notion of unfolding of a set
a admits now an expression through modal sentenes '

a
dened for any ardinal
number  as
'
+1
a
=: 4f'

b
: b 2 ag ; (7)
'

a
=:
∧
f'

a
:  < g for limit ardinals;  : (8)
Unfoldings of rank  are maximal from an informational point of view as they
gather all the information that is available at stage  about a set and its members.
In formal language this statement reads as the proposition: b j= '

a
i b

= a

.
Now this enables us to explain what we mean by observationally equivalent:
two sets, lasses or systems are said to be observationally equivalent if they
satisfy the same innitary modal sentenes, i.e. if they are modally equivalent.
We lose our short introdution with two general remarks stressing the beauty
of the Strutural Theory of Sets. First, a model U of this set theory an be seen
as the largest extension of a model V  U of ordinary Zermelo-Fraenkel-Axiom of
Choie (ZFC) set theory that still preserves the property of modal haraterization.
And seond, STS belongs to irular model theory, in the sense that it ontains
its own model as an objet in U.
Strutural unfolding of an arbitrary set or lass by means of modal desriptions
is the key for our further investigations in this artile. Indeed, we are going to
employ the strutural unfolding rule (7) as a model of the evolutionary proess of
the quantum universe.
5 Pereption, experiments, and quantum logi
The motivating question for this setion is whether ontinuity of pereived exper-
imental outomes generally implies that the observed physial matter has to be
ontinuous, too. This question and the negative opinion about it, saying that this
impliation is by no means neessary, has its own history. Poinare, for instane,
made a lear distintion between the physial ontinuum and the mathematial
ontinuum
3
{ he writes in 1905 [21℄:
We are next led to ask if the idea of the mathematial ontinuum is
not simply drawn from experiment. If that be so, the rough data of ex-
periment, whih are our sensations, ould be measured [...℄ It has, for
instane, been observed that a weight A of 10 grammes and a weight B
of 11 grammes produed idential sensations, that the weight B ould
no longer be distinguished from a weight C of 12 grammes, but hat the
weight A was readily distinguished from the weight C. Thus the rough
3
The author beame reently aware of the work of M. Planat [20℄ where an interpretation of
the pereption of time is given on the ground of Poinare's ideas.
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results of the experiments may be expressed by the following relations:
A = B; B = C; A < C, whih may be regarded as the formula of
the physial ontinuum. But here is an intolerable disagreement with
the law of ontradition, and the neessity of banishing this disagree-
ment has ompelled us to invent the mathematial ontinuum. We are
therefore fored to onlude that this notion has been reated entirely
by the mind, but it is experiment that has provided the opportunity.
We annot believe that two quantities whih are equal to a third are
not equal to one another, and we are thus led to suppose that A is
dierent from B, and B from C, and that if we have not been aware
of this, it is due to the imperfetions of our senses. [...℄
What happens now if we have reourse to some instrument to make up
for the weakness of our senses? If, for example, we use a mirosope?
Suh terms as A and B, whih before were indistinguishable from one
another, appear now to be distint: but between A and B, whih are
distint, is interalated another new term D, whih we an distinguish
neither from A nor from B. Although we may use the most deliate
methods, the rough results of our experiments will always present the
haraters of the physial ontinuum with the ontradition whih is
inherent in it. We only esape from it by inessantly interalating
new terms between the terms already distinguished, and this opera-
tion must be pursued indenitely. We might oneive that it would be
possible to stop if we ould imagine an instrument powerful enough
to deompose the physial ontinuum into disrete elements, just as
the telesope resolves the Milky Way into stars. But this we annot
imagine; it is always with our senses that we use our instruments; it is
with the eye that we observe the image magnied by the mirosope,
and this image must therefore always retain the haraters of visual
sensation, and therefore those of the physial ontinuum.
We want to explore the possibility of a physial ontinuum on a formal level. Let
X denote a set of nite ardinality N representing mutually exlusive events that
in our ontext represent the set of all possible outomes of a physial experiment,
and let P(X) be its power set. A proximity relation P is a binary relation between
the elements of X that is reexive and symmetri, but not neessarily transitive
[4, 3℄. We all the pair (X; P ) the proximity spae. For eah x 2 X the set
Q
x
= fy 2 X : xPyg
is alled a quantum assoiated to x 2 X. Then the set of all quanta, R =
fQ
x
jx 2 Xg, is alled the referene set of the proximity spae onsidered. Within
the referene set, quanta are the smallest reognizable subsets of X. Any subset
of X that is a union of of some quanta is alled a quantum set (or, a part in Bell's
terminology). We denote the set of all quantum sets as Q
P
.
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Within our interpretation of (X; P ), the proximity relation haraterizes the
indistinguishableness of outomes due to experimental errors. Experimental errors
too are present in our ability to pereive nature through our sensory elds gener-
ated by vision, touh, sound, and smell. Experimental errors in this sense are an
inherent feature of our limited ability to reeive information from nature. They
manifest the impossibility to prepare and to perform an experiment providing us
with outomes of unlimited preision. This natural limitation, whih is due to an
imperfet knowledge about the experiment setup and due to an limited ontrol of
the experiment proess, is expressed through quantum sets. In this ontext, we
say that a physial experiment, or a pereptual proess, with possible outomes in
X is imperfet if there is x; y 2 X, with x 6= y , suh that xPy .
Aording to Bell's work, quantum sets an be used immediately to onstrut
a model of quantum logi. In fat, the set Q
P
an readily be interpreted as a
omplete ortholattie, that is a tuple L
P
= (Q
P
;\
P
;[
P
;
?
), if we equip Q
P
with a
join operation [
P
taken as the usual set-theoreti union, with a meet operation \
P
of two quantum sets as the union of all quanta in their set-theoretial intersetion,
and with an unary relation
?
with
?
Q = fy 2 Xj (9x =2 Q)(xPy)g
for any Q 2 Q
P
. A omplete ortholattie is known to be a proper model for
quantum logi in the sense of von Neumann and Birkho [6℄. However, it has
not been introdued here as a lattie of losed subspaes of a Hilbert spae but
rather as a lattie of quantum sets (or, parts) for a given proximity spae (X; P ).
In this manner proximity relations an be viewed as an alternative entry to the
quantum realm{ as has been proposed by Bell [3℄. One may now diretly reover
observables, for instane, as the omplete ortholattie L
P
naturally extends to
a proposition system; physial observables are then dened through -morphisms
from a omplete Boolean algebra into the proposition system L
P
(for details, see
[19℄ or, more reently, [28℄).
It is evident that not all sets in P(X) are quantum sets; nevertheless a given
proximity relation oers a mathematial lassiation of any two sets in P(X).
Given A;B 2 P(X), we say A and B are separated if A \ B = ; and if for all
x 2 A it is Q
x
\ B = ;; and due to the symmetry of the proximity relation the
same holds for the elements of B. Generally, for any two sets A and B whih are
not separated one distinguishes two ases: superposition and inompatibility. For
an introdution of these ases we refer to the work of Resoni et al. [23℄, or,
on a more fundamental level, to Bell's original work [3, 4℄.
4
Both lasses resem-
ble situations in Hilbert spaes of quantum systems where two states may arise
in a linear superposition, and where two observables may be inompatible. We
stress that separability, superposition and inompatibility on a omplete ortholat-
tie generated from a proximity spae is in general not the same as separability,
4
In [4℄ Bell uses this lassiation to demonstrate that the human visual eld resembles
quantum behavior in terms of superposition.
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superposition and inompatibility arising on a omplete ortholattie assoiated to
losed subspaes of the quantum system's Hilbert spae. There may arise several
dierent ortholatties for one given quantum system. For example, let H be a
separable Hilbert spae, then we have the omplete ortholattie L
H
of losed sub-
spaes in H but at the same time we may obtain another omplete ortholattie L
P
as follows. Let  be a Hermitian operator on H admitting an orthonormal basis
b  H of non-degenerate eigenvetors of H. Eah eigenvetor x 2 b orresponds
to a measurement outome doumented with the assoiated eigenvalue 
x
2 R.
We dene the proximity relation P for all x; y 2 b
(xPy) i (
x
is indistinguishable from 
y
by experiment):
As mentioned earlier in this setion, suh a proximity relation an be readily used
to dene L
P
. And, learly, there is no neessity to imply that L
H
and L
P
are
isomorphi ortholatties in any plausible sense. Moreover, the present approah to
quantum logi via proximity spaes turns out to be a general method. This follows
from the fat that all omplete ortholatties L
H
representing losed subspaes of
a separable Hilbert spae H are isomorphi (as ortholatties) to proximity spaes
based on the proximity relation
(sP t) i (s; t) 6= 0 ;
for all s; t 2 Hnf0g, and where (:; :) is the inner produt onH [3℄. It is in this sense
that proximity relations give a general approah to the mathematial foundations
of quantum physis.
We may now inorporate modal logi and Kripke semantis into this framework.
This an be done rst by identifying the basis elements x 2 b as the possible
worlds, and the proximity relation P as the aessibility relationg between the
latter. Value assignment funtions are then onstruted as follows: for any x 2 b
we set v('
Q
x
) = T , and, moreover, for an arbitrary subset a  b we have v('
a
) =
T if Q
x
 a, and v('
Q
x
) = F if Q
x
* a. Here, again, '
a
denotes the proposition
\'
a
: An element x 2 b is haraterized as x 2 a" (see, setion 3). Hene, we
have established a Kripke struture on the elements of a given Hilbert spae basis
b by identifying the proximity relation P with the aessibilty relation R in Kripke
semantis.
A physially realized proximity spae (X; P ) thus enables us to onstrut a se-
manti interpretation of quantum logi. It is a general and alternative approah to
the quantum world as it provides us quite naturally with fundamental quantum on-
epts suh as omplete ortholattie, separation, superposition, and inompatibility.
It an be used also to model the indistinguishableness of experimental results suh
as parts in the pereptual eld without making expliit use of the mathematial
ontinuum P(
0
). From this point of view a proximity relation an be regarded as
a mathematial formulation of Poinare's physial ontinuum. And, when applied
to set of possible outomes of a quantum measurement, the proximity relation
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determines a Kripke struture where the possible worlds oinide with possible
measurement outomes.
6 Preferred bases and state seletion
in the quantum universe
As desribed in the introdution, we onsider the universe as a large quantum
system that proeeds step-wise from one stage to the suessive stage. Our aim
is to reonile our methods desribed in order to show by indution over the stage
ordinals  that a preferred basis emerges at all stages of the quantum universe.
To ahieve this goal, we rst formulate the proof statement for  in the setions
6.1, 6.2, and 6.3. In the latter setion we also show the validity of the base
ase  = 0. The indution step begins with setion 6.4 and it is ompleted with
Proposition 6.1 in setion 6.5. Setions 6.6 and 6.7 ontain further impliations
regarding Born's rule and state seletion.
Eah of the following setions begins with a main part that ends with a \"
sign; further omments and explanations are plaed thereafter.
6.1 Hilbert spae
At any ordinal stage , there is a omplex Hilbert spae H

with a number of
dimensions dimH

= N

. 
This assumption is a reapitulation of our original working hypothesis in that
the quantum universe is represented as a large but nite quantum register realized
as a omplex Hilbert spae of nite dimension.
5
6.2 Bases and states
At eah stage , there is a distinguished pure state 	

2 H

alled the state of the
universe at stage . Additionally, 	

is an element of a basis b

2 B(H

), where
B(H

) is the set of bases ofH

. Moreover, b

forms the family of non degenerate
eigenvetors of a Hermitian Hilbert spae homeomorphism 

: H

! H

alled
the self-test of the universe at stage . 
We remark that with the above assumptions stage dynamis, when seen as the
proedure of taking the step from one stage represented by 	

to the next stage
represented by 	
+1
, requires a proess apable of seleting a unique element
from the preferred basis b
+1
. But suh a proess intended annot be aom-
plished through usual no-ollapse approahes to the measurement problem{ suh
as through the deoherene method or through the many-worlds approah{ as
5
We will often all the whole Hilbert H

a quantum register or, simply, register.
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those are unable to explain the seletion of an individual state from the family of
pointer states, i.e. the apparent ollapse of the wave-funtion. Empirially, a ol-
lapse of the wave-funtion is ommonly experiened by human subjets onduting
a measurement. Moreover, as has been objeted for the many-worlds approah
[27℄, these methods even may fail to depit a preferred basis beforehand. Thus
not only it beomes unlear how to selet a single state, but it is also not evident
how the set of alternatives looks like where any (hypothetial) seletion proess is
about to at on. In ontrast to this situation, we propose an approah in whih
the emergene of a preferred basis and the seletion of a distinguished state out
of the elements of the preferred basis our naturally at every stage. This our-
rene may be alled a self-organization of the measurement. The ruial question
therefore is how this partiular self-organization of the measurement proess is
ever ahieved within the realm of the quantum universe. Are there, for instane,
rules or priniples that ontrol the intended emergene?
6.3 Modal satisfation
At eah stage  there is a modal sentene '

U
suh that it is satised by the
-unfolding U

of U, i.e. U

j= '

U
. Further, there is a funtion Z
U
from the
nite ordinals to the natural numbers suh that
1. if  <  then Z
U
()  Z
U
(), and
2. Z
U
() = dimH

for all nite ordinals . 
This ompletes our olletion of assumptions for the indutive proof. What
remains to be done is to show their validity in the +1 ase. We note that the base
ase for the indutive proof,  = 0, is veried readily with H
0
= f 1 :  2 Cg,
with (a; b) := a b for all a; b 2 H
0
, with the preferred basis b
0
= f1g, and with
the Hermitian operator 
0
= id
H
0
.
6.4 Strutural unfolding rule
The universe as a whole is an unknown lass U and it reveals its struture only
partially through a stage-wise unfolding proess. At a given ordinal stage , the
universe U unfolds due to the rule
'
+1
U
=: 4f'

u
: u 2 Ug (9)
= 4D
+1
;
with D
+1
= f'

u
: u 2 Ug. This is the strutural unfolding rule of STS, .f.
equation (9). And this rule enables us to onstrut a Kripke struture M
+1
U
=
hW
+1
U
; R
+1
U
; V
+1
U
i with a distinguished world w

2 W
+1
U
, i.e. with a w

2
W
+1
U
having the property
(w 2 W
+1
U
) (wR
+1
U
w

and w 6= w

) ;
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whih we all the point property of w

. This onstrution goes as follows. Given
an unfolding U
+1
j= '
+1
U
, onsider a series of hildren sets dened as
h
1
(U
+1
) := f'

u
1
: u
1
2 U
+1
g ;
h
2
(U
+1
) := f'
 1
u
2
: u
2
2 u
1
and u
1
2 U
+1
g ;
.
.
.
h
+1
(U
+1
) := f'
0
u
+1
: u
+1
2 u

and : : : and u
1
2 U
+1
g :
Then let us dene the funtion
Z
U
(+ 1) := 1 +
+1∑
i=1
jh
i
(U
+1
)j = N
+1
= N
0
: (10)
It follows that Z
U
is a monotoni funtion, beause the +1 unfolding is satised
by the set U
+1
whose members are all sets available that satisfy the modal
formula of the th unfolding. In this way the rst ondition in setion (6.3) is
already met. Equation (10) allows us to label uniquely eah modal formula '
i
n
with
a number n 2 f1; : : : ; N
0
 1g and with a determined stage number i 2 f0; : : : ; g
(Observe that in our onstrution a hoie of n already determines the value of i .).
Additionally, we hoose the only remaining formula '
+1
U
to be assoiated with the
number N
0
; in this way the distinguished world w

orresponds to '

N
0
= '
+1
U
,
i.e. we set h
0
(U
+1
) = f'
+1
N
0
g = f'
+1
U
g. So we have jW
+1
U
j = N
0
and eah
world w 2 W
+1
U
uniquely orresponds to a formula '
i
n
and the olletion of all
suh formulas onstitutes the set of possible worlds W
+1
U
with
W
+1
U
=
+1⋃
i=0
h
i
(U
+1
) :
A pointed graph (W
+1
U
; R
+1
U
) is onstruted by means of the binary relation
(w
n
R
+1
U
w
m
) i (9i 2 f1; : : : ; + 1g) ('
i
n
=: 4D
i
and '
i 1
m
2 D
i
);
where n;m 2 f1; : : : ; N
0
g. Further, to eah n
a
2 f1; : : : ; N
0
g suh that
(w
m
2 W
+1
U
) (w
n
a
R
+1
U
w
m
)
we assign the modal formula '
i
n
a
= '
i
a
, where a 2 A is an atomi set, i.e. a
set with no internal membership struture being a member of the lass A of all
atoms. In that ase any valuation assignment funtion v
n
2 V
+1
U
with n = n
a
returns the value 1 for any suh '
i
n
a
. Then it follows that for all n 2 f1; : : : ; N
0
g
eah valuation assignment funtion v
n
2 V
+1
U
gives
v
n
('
i
n
) = 1 (11)
due to the indutive appliation of the valuation assignment rules for modal for-
mulas, .f. rules (1) and (2) in setion 2. Also, for any m 6= n it is v
m
('
i
n
) = 0,
or in other words, the Singleton Valuation Assignment is valid.
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The strutural unfolding rule, equation (9), is the rst link in a hain of ar-
guments that eventually will result in the desription of the aforementioned self-
organization of measurements. The rule itself does not have any diret physial
meaning; instead this rule and the proess that it generates will attain a physial
meaning only a posteriori through what we all a simulation on a quantum om-
puter representing the physial universe, and in the next paragraphs we will explain
this what we mean by a simulation (we will show that it an naturally be desribed
by the mathematial onept of bisimulation). Then osmology, the physis of
evolution of the quantum universe, beomes an iterative proess on a quantum
omputer (a ertain program, so to say) with one speial aim: to perform a sim-
ulation of the strutural unfolding of U. Realling the priniples of Strutural Set
Theory, the fat is that we annot have any information about the unfolding's
subjet prior to its own unfolding. So, given a ompletely unknown universe U,
how does the related unfolding proess start? First, to put a denite meaning to
the unfolding rule, the proess' initial sentene '
0
U
has to be speied, beause
it is from this primitive nuleus where all suessive analytial experiments, i.e.
the stages of unfolding, follow. Thus before any simulation ould ever be exe-
uted, the strutural unfolding proess itself has to be initialized by what we all
a semanti realization of '
0
U
, whih is the point where the initial modal sentene
is lled with some meaning. Considering deeper questions about the nature of
the initial sentene as to whether we do have a priniple aess to its meaning
through the sienti method, or even whether we are in the priniple position
to dedue it from more primitive arguments lies mostly beyond the sope of this
work. In the next setion at least, we will argue that '
0
U
has to be satised by a
non-wellfounded objet.
In any ase, we outline our original thought again beause it will serve us as a
guiding priniple heneforth:
Simulation Priniple. The physial universe is a simulation of the strutural
unfolding proess of a prinipally unknown lass U.
With this priniple our goal is to nd a proper method that allows us to desribe
the ommuniation between the strutural unfolding proess and its simulation on
the universal quantum omputer. As was already motivated in the introdution,
the method in question omes with Kripke strutures. How an a strutural un-
folding proess of an objet U naturally lead to a Kripke struture? In setion 4
we have seen that at any ordinal stage a Kripke struture an be realized easily.
Take U
+1
to be a set that satises '
+1
U
then U
+1
an be regarded as the point
node of a Kripke struture; and all elements in U
+1
beome immediate sues-
sor nodes of the point if we additionally regard the onverse membership 2
 1
as
the direted edge binary relation on all these nodes. But in general the suessor
nodes themselves are not strutureless as they again satisfy some modal sentenes
generated by our unfolding rule. In this way eah suessor node ontains a se-
ondary Kripke struture in the aforementioned sense. If we iterate this proedure
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and onurrently identify eah node with the orresponding modal sentene that
it satises, we ome up with a number of all modal sentenes available at the
 + 1 stage{ whih is the number N
0
in equation (10).
6
As a onsequene, we
obtain a set of all modal sentenes at unfolding stage + 1 whih then beomes
the set of possible worlds W
+1
U
. Finally, equipped with aessibility relation R
+1
U
between modal sentenes, this set beomes a pointed direted graph. We observe
that R
+1
U
is not transitive. Within this graph there may be nodes whih do not
have any internal membership struture anymore. For example, let U
2
= f;; 1g be
an unfolding of the seond ordinal stage then the empty set ; 2 U
2
satises some
modal sentene '
1
;
; and in general many suh sentenes may our where eah
one is satised by a member of the lass of all atoms A, suh as ; 2 A. Beause
of the given satisfation for atoms, all assoiated value assignment funtions are
trivially determined to return a truth value (T ); this is simply beause satisfation
a j= '
i
n
a
; a 2 A; is equivalent to v
n
a
('
i
n
a
) = 1. Having assigned this value to
all modal sentenes that are satised by atoms we may then indutively verify the
desired Kripke strutureM
+1
U
through our modal satisfation rules, .f. equations
(1) and (2).
6.5 Preferred basis hoie
We are now ready to introdue the Bisimulation Priniple. At any given stage
+ 1 there is a seondary Kripke model M
+1

having the following properties
1. M
+1

= hW
+1

; P
+1

; V
+1

i is a Kripke struture, with jW
+1

j = jW
+1
U
j =
N
0
, with P
+1

being a proximity relation but now ating as an aessibility
relation on W
+1

, and with V
+1

being a set of value assignment funtions,
respetively.
2. There is a deomposition P
+1

=
+
P
+1

[
 
P
+1

suh that for any  
+
P
+1

 
0
there is exatly one  
0 
P
+1

 , i.e.
+
P
+1

is the inverse relation to
 
P
+1

.
Then for every  2 W
+1

there is a unique '
i
n
2 W
+1
U
suh that  and
'
i
n
are bisimilar, i.e. there exists a bisimulation 
B
with  
B
'
i
n
. All suh
pairs  
B
'
i
n
2 W
+1

 W
+1
U
are disjoint. By a bismulation we mean
binary relation 
B
on W
+1
U
W
+1

satisfying
(a) if ' 
B
 then (9j)(v
j
(') = 1), (9j
0
)(v
j
0
( ) = 1),
(b) if ' 
B
 and 'R
+1
U
'
0
then (9 
0
)( 
+
P
+1

 
0
and '
0

B
 
0
),
() if ' 
B
 and  
+
P
+1

 
0
then (9'
0
)('R
+1
U
'
0
and '
0

B
 
0
),
where ';'
0
2 W
+1
U
and  ; 
0
2 W
+1

; and, for onveniene, we have used
the same symbols for the valuation assignment funtions v
j
, j 2 f1; : : : ; N
0
g,
in both Kripke strutures.
6
Here, we have made the assumption that at any ordinal stage the number of modal sentenes
is always nite, and thus N
0
remains nite at eah stage. This assumption beomes onsistent
with our basi requirement saying that for eah nite ordinal stage we have only a nite quantum
universe register.
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Let us explain these properties. First, the existene of a Kripke model M
+1

is postulated in whih the proximity relation P
+1

plays the role of an aes-
sibility relation. In out understanding. this Kripke model will eventually turn
out to be the quantum universe. We know that M
+1
U
onsists of a direted
graph, i.e. the relation R
+1
U
is not symmetri, while on the other hand P
+1

is
a symmetri aessibility relation by denition. Thus for the seond property to
be meaningful, we have to hoose only that olletion of ordered pairs in P
+1

that orresponds to all ordered pairs of possible worlds in R
+1
U
. Without loss
of generality, this hoie is made by taking the relation
+
P
+1

out of the unique
deomposition P
+1

=
+
P
+1

[
 
P
+1

whih in turn implies a deomposition
M
+1

=
+
M
+1

[
 
M
+1

. As a onsequene, the intended bisimulation is well
posed, and so it shows that two worlds in two dierent Kripke strutures M
+1
U
and
+
M
+1

have an equivalent struture in terms of their valuations and in terms
of their aessibility relations. Any two bisimilar worlds in Kripke models satisfy
the same (innitary) modal language, i.e. that they are observationally equiv-
alent. And even the onverse is true, i.e. two worlds satisfy the same modal
language if they are bisimilar (The proof of this equivalene is given in hapter 19
of [18℄.). Thus in nite systems observational equivalene and bisimulation are
the same although this fat does not need to hold for large systems [2℄. Sine
the seond ondition further requires that there are exatly N
0
of disjoint bisimilar
pairs between M
+1
U
and
+
M
+1

, we say that these Kripke strutures are bisimilar
and write M
+1
U

B
+
M
+1

. In this manner, with bisimulation, we have found a
framework to express our preliminary simulation priniple with mathematial rigor:
Bisimulation Priniple. 8 : M

U

B
+
M


.
Here, we have replaed +1 with  beause this priniple is regarded from now
on as a general postulate for all stages of unfolding{ and thus it stands independent
of our ongoing indutive proof.
Next we quote a result whih will be proved at the end of setion 7. The
proof requires a slightly dierent mathematial ontext whih is the reason why
we do not present it right away. Nevertheless, this result demonstrates already
the relevane of the Bisimulation Priniple, and so it will help us to derive several
onlusions.
Proposition 6.1 The Bisimulation Priniple valid at stage + 1, viz.
M
+1
U

B
+
M
+1

implies the following statements:
(i) There is a Hilbert spae H
+1
 H

with dimH
+1
= N
0
.
(ii) There is a preferred basis b
+1
2 B(H
+1
), i.e. the basis elements form a
family of orthonormal elements in H
+1
suh that eah basis element is a
non-degenerate eigenvetor of a Hermitian operator 
+1
ating on H
+1
.
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(iii) The preferred basis naturally extends to a proximity spae (b
+1
; P
+1

) and,
moreover, to the Kripke struture M
+1

.
This proposition ompletes the indutive proof. 
The Bisimulation Priniple proposes the existene of a physial spae M
+1

equipped with a proximity relation P
+1

, whih we identify as the quantum uni-
verse. In the previous setion we have argued already that the unfolding proess
itself does not attain a diret physial meaning. Therefore the Kripke struture
M
+1

is the physial plae where the simulation of the strutural unfolding hap-
pens. In fat, Proposition 6.1 shows us that this physial plae omes with the
desired Hilbert spae properties. This is one of the ornerstones of the Bisimula-
tion Priniple.
Let us further omment on the properties of the Kripke struture M
+1

. The
main step here has been the identiation of a the proximity relation P
+1

with
the aessibility relation for Kripke strutures. In this ontext the question imme-
diately arises asking for the origin of a proximity relation within a self-experiment
of the quantum universe. First of all, as has been argued in setion 5, all physial
experiments{inluding those experiments whih involve the whole universe{ are ex-
peted to be imperfet. We think that the origin of the proximity relation really is
a basi priniple saying that every self-observing system in nature, suh as is likely
the quantum universe to be, is inapable to perform a self-experiment that would
allow to resolve its own underlying physial struture ompletely. What we mean by
underlying physial struture is that should there be fundamental physial degrees
of freedom aessible through physial experiments, then no self-observing system
in nature ould totally resolve its own state in terms of these degrees of freedom.
Also, all experiments onduted within the universe are self-measurements of the
latter, beause no experiment onduted in nature an be totally isolated from the
surrounding universe. So, at any experiment that the quantum universe organizes
onto itself there are at least two (but usually many more) mathematially well
distinguished outomes (or, degrees of freedom) blurred in suh a way that they
annot be separated through the outome of the test. As we know, this fun-
damental fuzziness is mathematially manifested in the proximity relation. Using
our notion of imperfet experiments we make this thought to our seond guiding
priniple.
Imperfetion Priniple. Every measurement within the universe is imperfet,
that is, it gives rise to a non-trivial proximity relation.
Evidently, the Imperfetion Priniple is logially weaker than the Bisimulation
Priniple in that it only requires the existene of a proximity relation but does not
ditate its mapping struture.
With the Bisimulation Priniple we note another insight into the the quantum
universe. Reall that for any ordinal  the proximity relation P
+1

is reexive, i.e.
it is  P
+1

 for all  2 W
+1

. This obviously is true beause it is x 2 Q
x
for any
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quantum Q
x
, whih trivially means that any objet is indistinguishable from itself.
Therefore, when seen as a node within a labeled graph, eah possible world in the
Kripke struture M
+1

is pitured along with a losed loop representing reexivity.
Then, sine M
+1
U

B
+
M
+1

holds, the aessibility relation R
+1
U
in M
+1
U
has
to be reexive, too. Sine R
+1
U
represents the (inverse) membership relation for
sets 2
 1
, this requirement leads us to the proposition that eah possible world in
M
+1
U
is satised by an non-wellfounded set, beause we readily have
'
i
n
R
+1
U
'
i
n
, u
n
2 u
n
;
with n 2 f1; : : : ; N
0
g and with u
n
j= '
i
n
for any ' 2 W
+1
U
. We annot further
determine whether the objets u
n
really are (non-wellfounded) sets in the sense
of STS, as they still might be proper lasses or large systems; this ignorane, of
ourse, is due to our lak of knowledge about the semanti realization of the initial
modal sentene '
0
U
standing at the beginning of the strutural unfolding proess of
U. Any objet satisfying '
0
U
must be an atom, i.e. it does not have any suessor
node in M
+1
U
exept for itself. As a onsequene, the non-wellfounded, or, self-
referential, harater of suh an objet is inherited into all possible worlds inM
+1
U
by means of the strutural unfolding rule. Thus the Bisimulation priniple exposes
a feedbak from
+
M
+1

to M
+1
U
in that it requires that all modal sentenes '
i
n
in
M
+1
U
must be satised by non-wellfounded sets. At this point we quote a result
about those sentenes [1, 2℄: if a set a is non-wellfounded then it is haraterizable
only by a sentene of innitary modal logi. We immediately onlude that all
'
i
n
2M
+1
U
annot be sentenes of nitary modal logi, hene they involve innite
logial onjuntions. Further, it is worthwhile to remark that in [22℄ the property
of reexivity of an aessibility relation is assigned to self-awareness of an agent
represented by the Kripke struture in question. With the Bisimulation Priniple
we thus are in the position to dedue the self-referential harater of the quantum
universe on a formal level.
In gure 1 we illustrate the Bisimulation Priniple employing a simple example.
6.6 Born's rule
We let the Kripke struture M
+1
U
be equipped with a weighting funtion on all
possible worlds, !
+1

: f1; : : : ; N
0
g ! [0; 1℄. Thus given a preferred basis b
+1
, we
may evaluate the basi probability assignment m('
i
n
) for an arbitrary hosen modal
sentene '
i
n
2 W
+1
U
. Due to the fat that the Singleton Valuation Assignment
(SVA) is valid in our onstrution, i.e. exatly one modal sentene is true for eah
one of the possible worlds inW
+1
U
(see equation (11)), we are allowed to evaluate
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MU
3 MΣ
3+
ch (U 3)3
MΣ
3−
ch (U 3)2
ch (U 3)1
ch (U 3)0
Figure 1: Exemplary illustration of the Bisimulation Priniple realized at  = 3 with
U
3
= fa
1
; 1; 2g = fa
1
; fa
2
g; fa
3
; fa
4
ggg, where a
1
; : : : ; a
4
2 A are atoms. For ex-
ample, a possible hoie would be a
1
= : : : = a
4
= ; resulting in the von Neumann
ordinal U
3
= 3. The upper two trees represent the Kripke struturesM
3
U
and
+
M
3

suh that M
3
U

B
+
M
3

. Arrows in M
3
U
are the elements in R
3
U
representing the
inverse membership relation 2
 1
, while the arrows in
+
M
3

are the ordered pairs of
the proximity relation
+
P
3

. The labels h
0
(U
3
); : : : ; h
3
(U
3
) represent sets of hil-
dren nodes (see, setion 6.4) suh that Z
U
(3) =
∑
jh
i
(U
3
)j = 1+3+3+1 = 8.
The lower right tree is the Kripke model with inverted orientation given through
 
P
3

. In all trees irles attahed to the nodes represent reexivity of
+
P
3

(and
of
 
P
3

) or non-wellfounded objets in M
3
U
, respetively.
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m aording to equation (6),
m('
i
n
) =
N
0∑
j=1
!
+1
j
v
j

✷

 ∨
'
i
n
R
+1
U
'
i 1
m
'
i 1
m


^

 ∧
'
i
n
R
+1
U
'
i 1
m
✸'
i 1
m




=
N
0∑
j=1
!
+1
j
v
j
(4f'
i 1
m
: '
i
n
R
+1
U
'
i 1
m
g) (12)
= !
+1
n
;
whih means that only one possible world labeled with j = n yields a truth value
of 1 for '
i
n
and is therefore weighted with the fator !
+1
n
; in this way the latter
turns out to be the basi probability assignment of an arbitrary modal sentene '
i
n
.
Let  
n
2 b
+1
be the unique basis element that is bisimilar to '
i
n
, i.e.  
n

B
'
i
n
.
We then identify Born's rule as
!
+1
n
= j( 
n
2 b
+1
;	

)j
2
= P ( 
n
2 b
+1
j	

) ; (13)
where 	

is the state of the universe at the present stage . 
6.7 State seletion, predition, and explanation
Given a preferred basis b
+1
, let  

2 b
+1
be the unique state that is bisimilar
to the point '
+1
N
0
2 M
+1
U
, then 	
+1
:=  

beomes the state of the universe
in the + 1 stage. 
State seletion is aomplished here through the rule saying that at every
ordinal stage the one preferred basis element beomes the state of the universe
that is bisimilar to point, i.e. to the distinguished world, in M
+1
U
. Obviously, no
wave ollapse or state redution takes plae; only a given preferred basis element
in H

is replaed by another preferred basis element in H
+1
. But why do we
selet  

element as the new state of the universe? We think that this kind of
seletion is natural, beause  

is bisimilar to the distinguished modal sentene
'
+1
N
0
2 M
+1
U
that has been reursively reated out of all preeding stages of
unfolding. This modal sentene is logially onsistent with all '

U
with  < +1,
and is therefore the one arrying maximum information about the membership
struture of U available at stage + 1.
Even though the above rule desribes how the next state of universe is to
be seleted, it is inaessible for any self-referential observer, inluding the whole
quantum universe itself, to determine whih element of the forthoming preferred
basis b
+1
will be the next state. This ignorane is a diret onsequene of the
Imperfetion Priniple, whih says that the struture of the proximity relation P
+1

is prinipally unknown to any self-referential observer, and there is no way for the
latter to translate the state seletion rule into a deterministi predition for the
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next state of the universe 	
+1
. Therefore, we do not have a onit with the
indeterministi nature of quantum physis.
We see that what at most an be done in prediting the suessive state of the
universe is to apply Born's rule{ resulting in a purely probabilisti foreast. This
kind of predition, however, prerequisites a knowledge of the preferred basis b
+1
beforehand, and rst of all it is questionable whether the preferred basis is at the
observer's disposal before the quantum universe ompleted its state seletion step
	

7! 	
+1
. But even if it would be aessible a priori, then no observer ould
ever aquire omplete information about b
+1
beause the proximity relation P
+1

would ause many elements in b
+1
to be pereptually indistinguishable (reall that
the existene of preferred basis already implies that there is a proximity relation
on it{ as stated in Proposition 6.1). We therefore onlude that Born's rule in its
usual form, equation (13), simply does not represent orretly the situation whih
an observer within the quantum universe is onfronted with. Instead, a multi-
valued version of Born's rule{ taking into aount the proximity relation{ has to
be introdued suh that point-like indisernible elements of b
+1
in equation (13)
are replaed with quanta. Thus \Born's rule" in this ase reads
P

( 2 b
+1
j	

) :=
∑
'
i
n
2Q
0
m('
i
n
) =
∑
 
0
2Q
j( 
0
2 b
+1
;	

)j
2
; (14)
where the quantum set Q 2 Q
P
(b
+1
) is dened as the union of all quanta that
ontain  as an element, and where Q
0
is the olletion of modal sentenes, i.e.
possible worlds in M
+1
U
, suh that Q
0

B
Q. Equation (14) may diretly be
rewritten in terms of a belief measure Bel on P(b
+1
). For this purpose dene
the basi probability assignment m : P(b
+1
)! [0; 1℄ as
m(A) :=
{
m('
i
n
) ifA = f g with '
i
n

B
 ;
0 otherwise.
Then equation (14) reads as
P

( 2 b
+1
j	

) =
∑
AQ
m(A) = Bel(Q) : (15)
It is worthwhile to emphasize that our onstrution of this belief measure eetively
restrits the domain of Bel to the omplete ortholattie L
P
of quantum sets in
P(b
+1
). Therefore a value Bel(Q), with Q 2 P(b
+1
), is dened only if Q is
a quantum set. This restrition stems diretly from the fat that we always look
for all quanta that have our element of onern as a member; only on this union
of relevant quanta the belief measure Bel may be evaluated.
7
In other words,
traditional Born's rule, equation (13), indues a probability measure on P(b
+1
)
7
We may easily enhane to the domain of Bel to the whole power set P(b
+1
), if for any
A 2 P(b
+1
) we take Bel(A) := Bel(Q
A
), where Q
A
is the smallest quantum set that ontains
A as a subset, but this enhanement does not provide any new insights.
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interpreted as a -algebra of events P(b
+1
). On the ontrary, due to equation
(15), a given proximity relation P
+1

indues a belief measure Bel on the set of
all quantum sets Q
P
(b
+1
)  P(b
+1
) interpreted as a omplete ortholattie of
events L
P
= (Q
P
(b
+1
); \
P
; [
P
;
?
).
After state seletion, the universe is in the state 	
+1
. At this moment of
exotime we may ask for a probabilisti explanation of the present state (In the
same way as Born's rule gives a probabilisti predition for possible next states).
We ask: given 	
+1
, what is the probability assignment for all preferred basis
elements in b

? But we may not apply Born's rule again in order to explain the
present state 	
+1
, beause this hoie will not lead to a probability measure on
P(b

) in general, viz.
N∑
i=1
j(	
+1
;  
i
2 b

)j
2
< 1 :
Probabilisti explanation (often referred to as onditioning) usually is alulated
with the Bayes rule. Aording to it the posterior probability P ( 2 b

j	
+1
) at
stage + 1 reads as
P ( 2 b

j	
+1
) =
P (	
+1
j 2 b
+1
)P ( 2 b

)
P (	
+1
)
; (16)
where P ( 2 b

) is the prior probability of a state in H

realized as  , and where
the normalizing onstant is (we write simply \ " instead of \ 2 b

")
P (	
+1
) = P (	
+1
j )P ( ) + P (	
+1
j: )P (: )
= j(	
+1
;  )j
2
P ( ) + (1  P ( ))
∑
 
0
? 
j(	
+1
;  
0
)j
2
:
A alulation of the posterior prerequisites a knowledge about the value of the
prior. But, like in the ase of predition, no observer present in stage +1 is able
to tell what basis element in b

used to be the exat state of the universe, beause
likewise there are at least as many alternatives possible as there are elements in the
assoiated quanta. We are again onfronted with multivalued mappings so that
a treatment of this problem in the sense of Dempster-Shafer theory is indiated.
Thus we may replae equation (14) with its assoiated value of the belief measure
Bel on Q
P
(b

)  P(b

):
P

( 2 b

j	
+1
) :=
∑
AQ
m(A) = Bel(Q) ; (17)
where Q is the quantum set being the union of of all quanta (generated through
the proximity relation P


) that hold  2 b

as a member, and where m : P(b

)!
[0; 1℄ is dened as
m(A) :=
{
P ( 2 b

j	
+1
) ifA = f g with '
i
n

B
 ;
0 otherwise,
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with '
i
n
2M

U
.
In summary, we have shown that any observer{ inluding the quantum uni-
verse itself{ an make quantitative statements about the future or about the past
in exotime only in terms of modalities representing the degree of belief, aord-
ing to Dempster-Shafer theory of evidene. This is the main dierene to the
\traditional" approah via Born's rule.
7 Metris, tree metris, and embeddings
A basi test for any quantum mehanial desription of the universe is the neessity
for an explanation of an apparently smooth three-dimensional manifold struture
that on many length sales does not exhibit any quantum harater whatsoever.
A smooth three-dimensional spae is one of the basi pillars of our external ex-
periene. Surely, there are further levels of diÆulties related to this issue; for
instane, the problem of how a quantum treatment of the universe may plausibly
emerge into a unied desription of spae and time resulting in a four-dimensional
manifold struture being loally isomorphi to Minkowski spae. And nally, there
still remains the open question of how a general representation of spae, time and
matter ould ever be aomplished in suh an approah to inorporate full General
Relativity. With regard to a solution of these problems we have just gained rst
insights; so, for example, Eakins and Jaroszkiewiz [12, 13℄ propose that the fator
struture of the seleted state 	

of the universe may ultimately be responsible
for a lassial Einstein universe. In their interpretation, the interplay of fatorized
and entangled states may give rise to ausal sets, i.e. to the basi building bloks
of Einstein loality.
The present work permits for a slightly dierent point of view on the problem of
the basi building bloks of the universe, i.e. the fundamental degrees of freedom.
Our understanding is that at present there are at least two dierent ategories of
approahes to this problem. The rst ategory ontains all those attempts whih
reognize one paradigm, namely, that the fundamental degrees of freedom of the
universe must be losely related to the set of elementary degrees of freedom in
General Relativity, that is, to geometrial points on a Lorentzian four-manifold.
All attempts that try to onstrut a quantization of General Relativity ertainly
fall into this ategory. But there is a seond ategory in whih it is not presumed
a priori that suh a relation to General Relativity exists. Physial approahes of
the seond type look for other{but not less signiant{ aspets of nature that
are not diretly assoiated with relativisti spae-time struture. Surely, in a er-
tain approximation or limit these approahes have to prove onsisteny with the
priniples of General Relativity but there is no neessity to explain the intended
onsisteny in the rst plae. We think that the desription of the self-referential
quantum universe presented in this work ould be a andidate for the seond ate-
gory. We will show that this desription will provide us with a olletion of degrees
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of freedom being of quite a dierent nature than a olletion of geometrial points
onstituting a smooth manifold. Thus although a onsisteny proof with General
Relativity remains to be done, we put forward the hypothesis that there are other
aspets of nature that any theory of the elementary degrees of freedom in physis
has to meet. The goal of this setion is to explore these aspets and to identify
their degrees of freedom.
Following Bell [4, 3℄, we introdue the notion of ontinuity for proximity spaes.
Given a proximity spae (X; P ) we say (X; P ) is P -ontinuous if for any x; y 2 X
there is a set fx; z
1
; : : : ; z
n
; yg suh that the set fxPz
1
; : : : ; z
n
Pyg exists. We
onlude that even if X is disrete, a proper notion of pereptual ontinuity an
be dened beause within eah sequential pair of points in fx; z
1
; : : : ; z
n
; yg one
point is indisernible from the other. We all the set fx; z
1
; : : : ; z
n
; yg open path
from x to y and onurrently assume that an open path does not ontain losed
paths, i.e. eah element in fx; z
1
; : : : ; z
n
; yg appears exatly one within the open
path. We dene the length of an open path as l(x; y) := jfx; z
1
; : : : ; z
n
; ygj   1,
and set the trivial ase l(x; x) = 0 for all x; y 2 X. For any ordinal stage of
the quantum universe onsider now the Kripke struture M


. The set M


is a
proximity spae (as it is equipped with the assoiated proximity relation P


), and
it also is P -ontinuous. Even more, M


is a tree, beause for any  ; 
0
, with
 6=  
0
, there is exatly one path leading  to  
0
. The tree property of M


diretly follows from the fat that M

U
is onstruted as a tree, and from the
validity of the bisimulation priniple M

U

B
+
M


. We employ the uniqueness of
open paths in M


to dene the disrete tree metri d

T
on M


as
d

T
: W


W


! N
0
with d
T
( ; 
0
) := l( ; 
0
):
We nd that it is again the Bisimulation Priniple whih invokes this disrete
metri struture on M


= b

 H

. But what does this metri mean physially?
If we onsider two separated sets f g; f 
0
g  b

in the sense of separation given
in setion 5, then the two orresponding elements in H

are pereptually (or by
means of any self-experiment in the universe) distinguishable, beause there is no
 P


 
0
. From a physial point of view these elements represent two objets of
the universe whih should exhibit a quantitative similarity relation mathematially
equivalent to the tree metri d

T
. Before we explore further the mathematial
and physial impliations of the tree metri, let us briey reonile the general
harater of metris in physis, and here espeially the role of distane in spae.
In physis, the elementary similarity relation between two objets normally is
their distane in three-dimensional spae. It is given by a value of a funtion d
onventionally understood as a metri on a three-dimensional Riemannian manifold
M. Distane in spae has always been seen as the most fundamental mathematial
relation in physis, beause spae itself has been understood as the stage where
all physial ation happens. Before the advent of General Relativity spae had the
role of a ompletely rigid and passive struture unable to expose any interation or
feedbak with physial objets. Spae (and time) served solely as a mathematial
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onguration spae (sometimes also alled a blok universe){ not more than a
onvenient labeling method for physial objets in oordinates of three-spae and
in time. General Relativity gave spae and time a dynamial role and therefore a
true physial meaning. However, General Relativity still shares the point of view
that (loal) three-dimensional spae and time ought to be fundamental elements
of physial experiene. This heritage is a remainder from times when the universe
was regarded as a rigid bok and it nds its expression in the fat that Einstein's
eld equations determine a metri tensor of a four-manifold as a solution. But
what quantum theory taught us among many other things is the important lesson
that physial objets often have degrees of freedom that in general do not admit
a proper desription in a onguration spae being a smooth three-dimensional
Riemannian manifold (We do not onsider time as true physial degree of freedom
heneforth.). The quest for a theory of quantum gravity is the searh for a theory
of the fundamental degrees of freedom in physis. We therefore believe that
diÆulties must arise in any attempt to onstrut a quantum version of General
Relativity, simply beause the latter initially narrows the view to three-spae as a
andidate for a fundamental onguration spae in physis while the former allows
for a broader view where the elementary degrees of freedom might well belong to a
ompletely dierent onguration spae. Therefore, it is at least questionable why
the elementary degrees of freedom in physis should form the domain of a metri
in three-spae. Surely, there should be a proper limit in whih a metri in three-
spae ould be reovered, but this requirement does not invalidate the previous
argument. Still, fundamental degrees of freedom in physis must nevertheless
exhibit the possibility of pairwise omparison by means of a mathematial relation
that is physially plausible at the same time. This assumption is reasonable beause
in any physial theory there must be an option to deide whether two aessible
degrees of freedom an be distinguished or not, and further, there should also be
a plausible degree of similarity for already distinguished degrees of freedom.
In our approah suh a similarity relation naturally omes with the tree met-
ri d

T
operating on the Kripke struture M


. So, with the previous arguments
in mind, we want to extend our view on similarity relations in physis and ask:
are there physial objets that are omparable by means of a tree metri? We
think that there are suh objets and in order to nd them we have to reall a
fat, namely, that physial objets are arriers of information. This means that in
general a physial objet's identity not only onsists of the assembly of its phys-
ial onstituents, but that an inherent part of the objet's identity an be found
only within the amount of information that it onurrently arries. Therefore, a
redutionist representation of an objet in question by means of its onventional
physial building bloks would often not reveal the objet's true identity in nature.
To illustrate this issue, let us give three examples. A printed book, for instane,
ould be orretly desribed by means of a vast amount of individual physial par-
tiles altogether forming a ertain solid state. Suh a desription would involve a
giganti olletion of equations representing the fabri of the paper, while other
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equations would desribe the behavior of ink partiles, and so on. However, suh a
representation would make it pratially impossible to deipher the ontent of the
book's story and therefore an immanent part of the book's identity would be lost.
Another example are blak holes. Blak holes an be interpreted as lassial solu-
tions of Einstein's equations but we expet that this is probably only a small part
of the whole story. In the past three deades there has been a growing evidene
that blak holes are arriers of information plaed on their surfae, i.e. on their
event horizon. This information is likely to be aessible only through a orret
quantum desription of blak holes. A lassial blak hole solution in terms of
General Relativity thus is at most a simple desription of the physial arrier but
it is ertainly not a suitable representation of the information it{the blak hole{
atually holds. Our third example is the biologial maromoleule DNA. Here too
we may give a redutionist desription giving rise to a vast olletion of inter-
ating atoms in three spatial dimensions but suh a representation would again
hardly reveal something about the biologial meaning of the geneti ode. Hene,
it is not hard to nd physial objets whih are primely arriers of information and
whih only play a seondary role as extended objets in spae. Thus, any theory
whih aims to represent the true physial degrees of freedom in our universe has
to address this issue. For instane, it would not make muh sense to ompare two
books, say, by their spatial distane in order to desribe the information similarity
of their ontents{ so, loations in spae simple annot be the only fundamental
degrees of freedom in nature. Other similarity relations with dierent domains are
therefore neessary between physial arriers of information. And indeed, as we
are now ready to show, tree metris and related strutures turn out to be very
useful when it omes to ompare the information enoded in physial objets.
Sine Shannon's theory of ommuniation [26℄ it is known that any kind of
information an be stored in symboli sequenes. Symboli sequenes onsist of
symbols whih are taken from a (nite) alphabet. Any (english) book onsists of
a sequene of letters from the (english) alphabet. In a DNA we have sequenes
of hemial symbols from the alphabet fA;C; G; Tg. And even if we still do not
know the information ode of blak holes, an opinion assuming that the event
horizon is imprinted with letters from an hypothetial alphabet does at least not
ontradit our present understanding of these mysterious objets. Further, Shan-
non has shown that any symboli sequene an be translated into a mathematially
equivalent sequene built from zeros and ones only, i.e. into a sequene from the
binary alphabet f0; 1g. Could it therefore be{ and this is the main motivation for
the remainder of this setion{ that even the fundamental degrees of freedom in
the quantum universe are symboli sequenes?
We want to disuss this problem at a basi level using results from the math-
ematial theory of ut polyhedra (For this purpose we follow hapter 3 from the
review artile of Deza and Laurent [10℄). One of the immediate appliations of
this theory is the problem of embedding disrete metris into normed spaes. Our
aim is to look for a anonial isometri embedding of the tree metri d

T
(that
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is a distane preserving embedding) into a normed spae. We begin with a few
preliminaries. Let l
p
be the spae of sequenes of real numbers with norm
kxk
p
:=
(
1∑
i=0
jx
i
j
p
)
1=p
:
A measure spae (
;A; ) onsists of a set 
, a -algebra A of subsets of 
,
and a measure  dened on A whih is additive, i.e.
(
⋃
n1
A
n
) =
∑
n1
(A
n
)
for all pairwise disjoint sets A
n
2 A, and satises (;) = 0. The measure spae
is non negative if (A)  0 for all A 2 A. A probability spae is a non negative
measure spae with total measure (
) = 1. Given a measure spae (
;A; )
and a given funtion f : 
! R , its L
p
norm is dened by:
kf k
p
:=
(∫


jf (!)j
p
(d!)
)
1=p
:
Then L
p
(
;A; u) denes the set of measurable funtions, and the L
p
-norm denes
a metri struture on on L
p
(
;A; ).
Given any non negative measure spae (
;A; ), another metri spae (A

; d

)
an be dened, where A

= fA 2 A : (A) < 1g and d

(A;B) = (AB) for
A;B 2 A

(here, AB = fa 2 A : a =2 Bg [ fb 2 B : b =2 Ag for A;B  
).
In fat, (A

; d

) is the subspae of L
1
(
;A; ) onsisting of its f0; 1g-valued,
i.e. binary, funtions. A metri spae (X; d) is L
1
-embeddable if it is a subspae
of some L
1
(
;A; ) for some non negative measure spae, i.e. there is a map
 : X ! L
1
(
;A; ) suh that
d(x; y) = k(x)  (y)k
1
for all x; y 2 X. A useful result is the following Lemma (.f., Lemma 3.5 in [10℄).
Lemma 7.1 For a metri spae (X; d) the following assertions are equivalent
(i) (X; d) is L
1
-embeddable.
(ii) (X; d) is a subspae of (A

; d

) for some non negative measure spae
L
1
(
;A; ).
If we take (X; d) = (M


; d

T
) then this Lemma guarantees that there is a subspae
of f0; 1g-valued and -measurable funtions ontaining (M


; d

T
) as an isomet-
ri embedding. Thus we have established already a onnetion between binary
sequenes and L
1
-embeddable metris. A standard result is that any nite tree
metri (X; d) is isometrially embeddable into a nite subspae of l
1
, i.e. there
exist n = jXj vetors x
1
; : : : ; x
n
2 R
m
for some m 2 N suh that d
i j
= kx
i
  x
j
k
1
for 1  i < j  n. To this result the following theorem immediately applies (.f.,
Theorem 3.8 in [10℄).
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Theorem 7.1 Let (X; d) be a metri spae. The following assertions are equiva-
lent
(i) (X; d) is L
1
-embeddable.
(ii) (X; d) is l
1
-embeddable.
We therefore obtain the following Corollary readily.
Corollary 7.1 Let (W


; d

T
) be the nite tree metri as dened above with jW


j =
N. Then there is a non negative spae L
1
(
;A; ) of measurable funtions and a
subspae (A

; d

)  L
1
(
;A; ) of binary valued mappings suh that (W


; d

T
) 
(A

; d

).
Thus indeed the possible worlds in W


= b

are the harateristi funtions
on 
. So our original idea{ that symboli sequenes of enoded information
may be the building bloks of the quantum universe{ turned out to be orret
in some sense. And in order to stronger emphasize the relation to Shannon's
theory of ommuniation we give a few additionally remarks. The d

-metri is
the Hamming metri in (A

; d

) whih ounts the number of not equally valued
positions between two arbitrary harateristi funtions in (A

; d

). The values
orrespond to all individual sets fqg with q 2 
. For now we presume that 
 has
nite ardinality n, thus any harateristi funtion in (A

; d

) has nite domain.
Let further C
i
2 (A

; d

) denote the elements of the isometri embedding of
(W


; d

T
), that is, for every  ; 
0
2 W


there are indexes 1  i ; j  N suh
that kC
i
  C
j
k
1
= d

T
( ; 
0
). Can we reah a further haraterization of these
sequenes? One possibility is to regard eah C
i
as a odeword. In this manner a
ode sequene C

(n; k) of k 2 N odewords eah of length n 2 N an be enoded
as a k-tuple
C

(n; k) = (C
i
1
; : : : ; C
i
k
)
for all i
j
2 f1; : : : ; Ng with 1  j  k. We stress that while in Shannon's theory
of ommuniation information is enoded solely by means of a binary sequene of
values from Z
2
(or from any other nite eld), our enoding additionally refers to
the assoiated -measurable sets supp(C
i
j
)  
 in order to dene a binary ode
properly (Here, supp(C
i
j
) is the support of C
i
j
, i.e. supp(C
i
j
) = fe 2 
 : C
i
j
(e) =
1g.). Here, the set 
 an regarded as the arrier of enoded information.
A distinguished lass of odes depits those whih exhibit error orretion.
Suppose a ode sequene C

(n; k) has been enoded and transmitted through a
noisy hannel. After transmission of the rst n bits the reeiver holds a vetor
V
1
2 Z
n
2
; the reeiver also knows all odewords C
i
2 (A

; d

) with 1  i  N.
Additionally, we presume that the reeiver has the measure  on 
 at hand. The
problem of error orretion is this: when V
1
6= C
i
1
, an the reeiver reover the
orret odeword C
i
1
from V
1
? He an, if the sender knows beforehand that during
transmission there will be at most e 2 N errors, i.e. d

(C
i
1
; V
1
)  e holds, and
if any ball in L
1
of radius e ontains at most one odeword. In this situation
the reeiver just has to look for the nearest neighbor of V
1
in L
1
to get the
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orret odeword C
i
1
(this strategy is alled the nearest neighbor algorithm.). If
the mentioned prerequisites are met then C

(n; k) is an instane of a so-alled
error orreting [n
0
; N; e℄-ode, where n
0
= nk is the length of the ode. There is a
ondition on the metri struture ontrolling the ability of error orretion. Let d
m
be the minimum d

-distane of all disjoint odeword pairs then it is straightforward
to show that e  (d
m
 1)=2. Sine the tree metri d

T
embeds in L
1
isometrially,
we have d
m
= 1, and so it follows e = 0; therefore, C

(n; k) is haraterized as a
representative of a non error orreting [n
0
; N; 0℄-ode.
We have found an appropriate L
1
-embedding and a l
1
-embedding of the tree
metri (W


; d

T
), and we have reognized the elements of this embedding as
odewords of a binary ode we have not yet identied the elements in W


as
vetors in Hilbert spae. But this step an be done readily beause the embedding
is non negative, i.e. the embedded funtions are non negative elements in a non
negative measure spae L
1
(
;A; ). By Theorem 7.1, these funtions equivalently
determine non negative sequenes in l
1
, and every vetor spae element in l
1
of
the embedding must be an element of l
2
, the Hilbert spae. This follows beause
for any non negative sequene in x 2 l
1
it is kxk
2
 kxk
1
.
Let V
2
= fx
1
; : : : ; x
N
g be the family of vetors in l
2
whih onstitute an iso-
metri embedding of (W


; d

T
) in l
1
. With V
2
we dene the Eulidean distane
matrix D

2
2 Mat(C; N) with symmetri matrix entries
(D

2
)
i j
= kx
i
  x
j
k
2
;
for all v
i
; v
j
2 V
2
and 1  i ; j  N. Regarding D

2
as an N-dimensional vetor
spae homeomorphism D

2
: C
N
! C
N
, we pose the eigenvalue problem
(D

2
  )u = 0 ; (18)
with  2 C and u 2 C
N
. Sine D

2
is symmetri there is a unique orthonormal basis
f 
1
; : : : ;  
N
g of eigenvetors (after a possible normalization) orresponding to an
ordered sequene of real eigenvalues 
1
> 
2
> : : : > 
N
. This last property
together with the fat that 
1
must be the only positive eigenvalue of D

2
are
well known results about Eulidean distane matries due to Shoenberg [24℄.
Eulidean distane matries for large N have interesting properties; for example,
in [8℄ it is shown that when going from small negative to large negative eigenvalues
the orresponding eigenvetors experiene a loalization-deloalization transition.
Also, large negative eigenvalues permit a ontinuous treatment of the Eulidean
distane matrix leading to an integral equation being very similar to a Laplae
equation.
In basis of the eigenvetors f 
1
; : : : ;  
N
g we reover the Hermitian operator


=
N∑
i=1

i
P
i
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where P
i
= P
2
i
is the projetion onto the one-dimensional subspae spanned by
the eigenvetor  
i
. Then the preferred basis at stage  is
b

= f 
1
; : : : ;  
N
g = W


spanning the omplex Hilbert spae
H

= span
C
f 
1
; : : : ;  
N
g = (C
N
; k:k
2
) ;
where k:k
2
denotes the l
2
-norm for omplex vetors whih, as usual, is given by
the square root of the inner produt (:; :) of the Hilbert spae l
2
.
We are now in the position to prove Proposition 6.1. Sine the Bisimulation
Priniple holds at all ordinal stages  it is valid at +1. In this manner we repeat
all steps presented in this setion with  + 1 instead of ; thus we obtain the
Hilbert spae
H
+1
= span
C
f 
1
; : : : ;  
N
0
g = (C
N
0
; k:k
2
) ;
whih has dimH
+1
= N
0
and whih has H

as a subspae. The family of
eigenvetors f 
1
; : : : ;  
N
0
g is the preferred basis in H
+1
, i.e.
b
+1
:= f 
1
; : : : ;  
N
0
g ;
and the Hermitian operator 
+1
=
∑
i

i
P
i
is non-degenerate. This proves the
points (i) and (ii) in 6.1. To show point (iii) it suÆes to onsider b
+1
as the
domain of the proximity relation P
+1

, the latter whose existene follows from
the Bisimulation Priniple. We thus have a proximity spae (b
+1
; P
+1

). Finally,
we make (b
+1
; P
+1

) into the Kripke struture M
+1

by assigning to eah node
 
i
2 b
+1
the truth value v
j
( 
i
) = 1 for i = j , with 1  i ; j  N
0
. This ompletes
both the proof of Proposition 6.1 and our indutive proof stated at the beginning
of setion 6.
8 Conlusions and outlook
Let us return to the ve problems formulated in the introdution. With the Bisim-
ulation Priniple and with the Imperfetion Priniple we have attempted a plausible
explanation to all ve. The Bisimulation Priniple an thus be seen as a meta-
onept providing a new perspetive on these problems and on the two elementary
ingredients whih we have used: the strutural unfolding proess of analytial set
theory, and the proximity relation ating on all possible experiment outomes. We
have argued that the former admits a natural mathematial form of the stage
paradigm in the quantum universe; while, on the other hand, the latter is a diret
mathematial expression of the experimetalist's fundamental inability to perform
perfet experiments. Here, the Imperfetion Priniple is seen as an expliit inor-
poration of Poinare's physial ontinuum into a quantum theory of the universe,
and proximity spaes, whih provide a general approah to quantum logi, are
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the mathematial input for the Imperfetion Priniple. Both ingredients are for-
mulated in quite simple mathematial terms, but at the same time they provide
some interesting mathematial and physial impliations. Not only a possible so-
lution to the preferred basis and the state seletion problems in the ontext of a
self-referential quantum universe (that is, a quantum universe formulated on the
basis of non-wellfounded objets), but also a generalization of Born's rule due to
Dempster-Shafer theory, a onnetion between tree metris and binary odes, and
a haraterization of the quantum universe in terms of tree metris. Moreover, we
have argued that the natural appearane of tree metris might be a hint that there
exist other fundamental degrees of freedom of the universe beside pure geomet-
rial degrees, like positions in three-spae. This haraterization of the quantum
universe suggests that information sequentially enoded on physial arriers might
not only be essential in evolutionary biology but that it ould also play a deisive
role in evolutionary osmology.
Returning to the problem of how a smooth manifold struture of the universe
ould be reovered from this approah, we refer briey to phylogeneti algebrai
geometry [14℄. In this young mathematial eld omplex algebrai varieties are
studied that are naturally assoiated with probabilisti phylogeneti trees. These
are tree strutures where nodes and leafs represent nite probability distributions
and where ars between nodes represent probabilisti transition matries [14℄. Real
positive points on these omplex projetive varieties represent probabilisti models
of evolution and several examples of well-known lassial algebrai varieties have
been found: tori and among them Veronese and Segre varieties, and as well seant
varieties (these appear for other tree topologies that do ontain hidden nodes).
So far, all examples of phylogeneti algebrai varieties have been found through
analysis of small trees with only a few nodes or leafs, and algebrai geometry for
large (nite) phylogeneti trees is still unexplored territory. Here an interesting
onnetion of the present work to phylogeneti algebrai geometry appears sine
our results in setion 7 and partiularly Corollary 7.1 tell that eah Kripke struture
M


an be identied as a probabilisti phylogeneti tree in the above sense (that
is, every node or leaf of M


an be represented as an element of a non negative
measure spae (A

; d

)  L
1
(
;A; )). Although not yet rmly established, we
think that this onnetion to phylogeneti algebrai geometry allows for a global
and a loal view on M


. In taking on the global view one would try to study the
algebrai variety of eah M


in total, that is, one would try to nd one variety of
immense omplexity (by means of its number of dimensions) representingM


. On
the other hand, the loal and more familiar view on the quantum universe ould
reveal many loal algebrai varieties of low dimension attahed to eah branhing
point inM


. This seems not implausible beauseM


is a nested phylogeneti tree
struture onsisting of many small trees that altogether form the large tree. One
goal of suh a loal approah would be the representation of the quantum universe
M


as a smooth algebrai variety, i.e. as an algebrai manifold, by looking for ways
to dene a natural ontinuous transition between neighboring loal varieties based
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on P -ontinuity and its indued topology.
Our nal remark is about the evolutionary rules of the quantum universe. As
we have argued these rules inlude three initial entities: the unknown universe U,
the strutural unfolding rule in the form of equation (9), and the initial modal
sentene '
0
U
. These initial onditions determine the unfolding proess. Is there
possibly a freedom of hoie in the quantum universe, for example, a freedom
that permits to overwrite these rules with new ones? Under the assumptions that
the unknown set U is inaessible to any hanges and that the unfolding rule
is of universal validity, a possible way to alter these rules would be a semanti
hange in the initial modal sentene '
0
U
7! '
0
U
. Buheri argues that rules of rules
may exist within a quantum universe when formulated on the stage paradigm [9℄,
and he onjetures that suh rules should have probabilisti mathematial form.
Future work ould therefore look for ertain probabilisti or statistial models that
represent suh overwriting of rules.
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